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Abstract
Business failure is an existent and severe threat for entrepreneurs, but also offers an opportunity for learning. According to literature, failed
entrepreneurs are facing a tremendous learning experience. However, only very few studies focus on the long-term entrepreneur-related
consequences of failure and even less work is available on entrepreneurs who decide to restart (Ucbasaran et al. (2013)). The goal of the
thesis is to enhance business failure literature by focusing on behavioral outcomes of failure-based learning in the context of entrepreneurs
who decide to restart after experiencing business failure. Hence, it will be possible to analyze whether cognitive learning processes result
in changes of the entrepreneur’s behaviors and actions with respect to the subsequent business. Thus, the aim is to answer the following
research questions: (1) How do business models of an entrepreneur’s failed business and the subsequent business differ? (2) What explains
possible business model differences?
The business model concept is employed as a unit of analysis to identify learning outcomes of entrepreneurs by comparing the business
models of the initial, failed business and the subsequent business by conducting an in-depth multiple-case study. Particularly, five semi-
structured interviews with entrepreneurs who failed and restarted were conducted to allow for the theory building approach according to
Eisenhardt (1989). In addition, to triangulate data and enrich the findigns objectively two interviews were held with bankruptcy trustees,
experts in the field of business failure. Especially the information provided by the experts enhanced the cross-case analysis.
By employing the business model concept as a unit of analysis in the context of restart entrepreneurship, I am able to provide in-depth,
empirically-based insights into behavioral outcomes of failure-based entrepreneurial learning. The multiple-case study provides evidence
that an entrepreneur rather improves the business model of the failed business than creating a completely novel business model design for
a subsequent, new business. Findings also show that learning from failure is affected by situation-specific, entrepreneur-related conditions,
which becomes obvious in the business model design of the subsequent businesses. Particularly, the time span between failure and restart,
external support and outside options have an impact. Thus, learning from business failure does not automatically take place but is affected
by the entrepreneur’s willingness and ability to reflect on past experiences and further conditions that are beyond the entrepreneur’s scope
of influence. Therefore, the thesis enhances existing literature on failure-based learning as it highlights that failure-based learning does not
happen automatically, but requires certain cognitive capabilities that depict a precondition for successful transfer of learning outcomes to
an operational level. Overall, the thesis emphasizes a difference between business closure and serial entrepreneurship on the one hand and
business failure and restart entrepreneurship on the other hand. This distinction is of particular importance for entrepreneurship research,
as the behavior of serial entrepreneurs seems to follow a different logic compared to restart entrepreneurs. This important finding calls for
future research that may rely on the thesis as groundwork and contributes to a deeper understanding of restart entrepreneurship.
Managers or entrepreneur on the other hand shall use the findings as a guide. The thesis highlights the importance of the business model
and its benefits for the real-world as a tool to objectively consider value creation and capture. In particular, the entrepreneur or manager
shall check and critically analyze his or her business in terms of the internal and external fit the business model design. Furthermore, in the
case of an approaching or already existent business failure, entrepreneurs should take time for reflection and learning; consider external
advice and accept responsibilities and deal with costs of failure openly.
Keywords: Business Failure, Learning, Restart Entrepreneurship, Business Model
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1. Introduction
“Failure is simply the opportunity to begin again,
this time more intelligently.” Henry Ford (Mueller
and Shepherd (2012): 1)
Setting up a successful business is not easy. Even if a busi-
ness runs smoothly, entrepreneurs are continuously threat-
ened by negative developments and ultimately business fail-
ure. However, business failure does not necessarily mean
the end for any entrepreneurial dreams. But entrepreneurs
can take a second chance and restart with a new business,
with varying success (Cope (2011); McGrath (1999); Shep-
herd (2003)). To understand antecedents and consequences
of restarting, it is necessary to have a deeper look on the
basic nature of entrepreneurship and the important role of
the entrepreneur in creating and running a business. En-
trepreneurship encompasses a broad variety of activities,
which aim for creating and to a certain extent also running
a business (Gartner (1990)). During the life cycle of a busi-
ness, the entrepreneur takes an important and directive role
in determining the strategy and in operationalizing strategic
elements of the business (Douglas and Shepherd (2000);
Mullins (1996)).
Being self-employed leads to a variety of opportunities,
e.g. realizing own ideas and making nearly unlimited own
decisions (Bonnett and Furnham (1991); Douglas and Shep-
herd (2002)). Therefore, many individuals strive for en-
trepreneurial opportunities. However, as basic evolutionary
logic already introduces, there is variation, selection and
retention (Aldrich and Martinez (2001)). Eventually, not
many newly founded businesses make an entrepreneur’s
dream come true. There is only a 40% survival rate of new
businesses after six years (Headd (2003)). And only 10% of
the initially founded businesses remain in the market after
ten years (Mahmood (2000); Timmons and Spinelli (2004)).
In 2014, the New York Times welcomed new entrepreneurs
with the words “Welcome to the Failure Age!” (Davidson
(2014)).
Against this background, it is not surprising that busi-
ness failure is extensively discussed in recent studies (e.g.
Cardon et al. (2011); Jenkins et al. (2014); Mantere et al.
(2013); Mueller and Shepherd (2012)). However, only very
few studies focus on the long-term entrepreneur-related con-
sequences of failure and even less work is available on en-
trepreneurs who decide to restart (Ucbasaran et al. (2013)).
Literature provides evidence that a failed entrepreneur ex-
periences a time of grief and undergoes a learning process.
But what does the entrepreneur learn? Most studies (e.g.
Cope (2011); Douglas and Shepherd (2002); Politis (2005);
Shepherd (2003); Ucbasaran et al. (2013)) assume that
learning especially affects cognitive processes. But what
does this learning mean for business activities? After expe-
riencing failure, (former) entrepreneurs are at least theoret-
ically confronted with two options for their further career
(Cope (2011); Mueller and Shepherd (2012); Ucbasaran
et al. (2013)): (a) becoming an employee and resign from
being an entrepreneur or (b) looking for a new opportunity
to found a business and to restart as an entrepreneur.
Cope (2011) as well as Politis (2008), Stokes and Black-
burn (2002) and Ucbasaran et al. (2013), emphasize that
entrepreneurs who failed once and are engaged in an in-
tensive process of reflection and learning are most likely to
be involved in the creation of a new business. These en-
trepreneurs can be classified as restart entrepreneurs. Their
entrepreneurial experience is expected to foster a positive de-
velopment of the newly created business (Cope (2011); Poli-
tis (2008); Stokes and Blackburn (2002); Ucbasaran et al.
(2013)). Restart entrepreneurs tend to be considered as a
sub-group of habitual or serial entrepreneurs (e.g. Politis
(2008); Ucbasaran et al. (2003); Wright et al. (1997)). Ha-
bitual or serial entrepreneurs are individuals who are eager
to and interested in always being engaged in entrepreneurial
activity and to found one business after the other which is
not restricted to a preceding failure (Politis (2008); Rerup
(2005); Westhead et al. (2005)).
In contrast to prior literature, which emphasizes the
learning experience of restart entrepreneurs by rather fo-
cusing on a cognitive perspective, the aim of this thesis is to
analyze whether learning also leads to changes in the (strate-
gic) behavior of entrepreneurs. In this context, I follow
Ucbasaran et al. (2013) who suggest analyzing similarities
or changes between the failed business and subsequent busi-
ness of an entrepreneur in terms of the business model. The
business model concept is a suitable unit of analysis to ex-
amine behavioral outcomes of failure-based entrepreneurial
learning as it allows for understanding how a specific busi-
ness works in general (Magretta (2002); Osterwalder et al.
(2005)) and to analyze the activities that are necessary to
run the business in particular (Zott and Amit (2010); Zott
and Amit (2013)). Hence, it will be possible to analyze
whether cognitive learning processes result in changes of the
entrepreneur’s behaviors and actions with respect to the sub-
sequent business. Thus, the aim is to answer the following
research questions: (1) How do business models of an en-
trepreneur’s failed business and the subsequent business differ?
(2) What explains possible business model differences?
Before finding answers to the research questions, busi-
ness failure needs to be defined and the business model as
a unit of analysis needs to be introduced. Chapter 2 par-
ticularly considers the theoretical background to the thesis.
To answer the research questions, a qualitative research de-
sign was chosen. Data was collected from five restart en-
trepreneurs and additionally from two experts to triangulate
date. The data collection and data analysis process are con-
sidered in Chapter 3. Results of the multiple-case study are
presented in Chapter 4, where on the one hand a within-case
analysis aims for answering the first research question and
on the other hand a cross-case analysis aims for finding an-
swers to the second research question by developing propo-
sitions in line with a theory building approach. To support
propositions, Chapter 5 discusses each proposition individu-
ally reflecting on existing literature. Lastly, a conclusion will
summarize the thesis, state limitations and emphasize im-
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plications for managers and researchers developed from the
thesis.
The thesis generally contributes to research analyzing be-
havioral outcomes of business failure. Scientific discourse
and the literature stream are enhanced by transferring in-
sights from business model literature into the field of en-
trepreneurship research. The multiple-case study provides
a new perspective on restart entrepreneurs and their experi-
ence with business failure.
2. Theoretical Background
In the following, first a line of reasoning will be presented
which aims for the clear distinction and definition of busi-
ness failure. Afterwards, the overall process of business fail-
ure relying on Cope (2011) and Ucbasaran et al. (2013) will
be described. The second part of the theoretical background
then focuses on the business model as a unit of analysis as
suggested by Osterwalder et al. (2005) as well as Zott et al.
(2011). After a general introduction to business model lit-
erature, focus lies on the business model design concept by
Amit and Zott (2001).
2.1. Business Failure and Entrepreneurial Learning
A clear definition of business failure is essential to ensure
comparability among different research findings. Differences
in defining business failure may lead to diverse observations.
Nevertheless, there are numerous definitions of business fail-
ure across studies, which can be distinguished in very broad,
less broad-minded and narrow (Ucbasaran et al. (2013)). In
general, it is agreed that business failure corresponds to a
negative development of revenues, which may entail an in-
crease in costs (Shepherd (2003); Shepherd et al. (2000)).
The negative development of revenues may result in a less
beneficial or not beneficial business (Deakin (1972)). Con-
sequently, the entrepreneur faces difficulties, which most cer-
tainly lead to a crisis situation, which may or may not be de-
feated by implementing managerial actions. In this situation,
the entrepreneur is no longer able to meet set personal and
corporate goals, which then is understood as business fail-
ure by numerous authors (Cope (2011); Lewis and Churchill
(1983); McGrath (1999); Politis and Gabrielsson (2009)).
As the terms business failure and business closure often
overlap, first the difference between the two terms needs to
be explained before going into a detailed definition of busi-
ness failure (Stokes and Blackburn (2002); Headd (2003)).
Terminating business activities is a consequence of differ-
ent realistic and understandable reasons but has negative
emotions attached (Everett and Watson (1998); Stokes and
Blackburn (2002)). However, personal reasons such as re-
tirement and the choice to work for another employer or take
new business opportunities may cause the decision to close
down a business (e.g. Headd (2003); Everett and Watson
(1998); Everett and Watson (1998)). Thus, business closure
may also correspond to a voluntary termination of business
activities whereas business failure relates to a non-voluntary
termination of the business (Cope (2011); Headd (2003);
Shepherd (2003)).
Usually the broad definition of business failure corre-
sponds to discontinuity of ownership, which means the en-
trepreneur exits or sells the business (Everett and Watson
(1998); Ucbasaran et al. (2013)). But, similar to business
closure, discontinuity of ownership does not exclude volun-
tary decisions to leave the business e.g. for retirement, a
profitable sale of the business or a new business opportunity
(Everett and Watson (1998)). Thus, it is not an appropriate
definition of business failure in the context of this thesis.
In contrast, bankruptcy or liquidation is the narrowest
definition (e.g. Haswell and Holmes (1989); Moulton and
Thomas (1993); Stokes and Blackburn (2002); Thornhill and
Amit (2003); Watson and Everett (1993); Wennberg et al.
(2010); Zacharakis et al. (1999)) of business failure as it is a
distinctive, noticeable and observable event (Ucbasaran et al.
(2013); Cope (2011)). Additionally, bankruptcy follows a
clear process of events controlled by public authorities, from
which it is basically impossible to rehabilitate and thus marks
the final end of a business (Moulton and Thomas (1993)).
But bankruptcy, which is a judicial step, is too narrow as it ex-
cludes the possibility of final avoidance through external help
(Cope (2011); Watson and Everett (1996); Ucbasaran et al.
(2013)). Considering the example of the United States and
the European Union, there are installed mechanisms, which
prevent businesses from bankruptcy. In the US, Chapter 11
of the Federal Bankruptcy Code promotes the reorganization
of businesses to prevent them from going bankrupt (United
States Courts (2015)). A comparable mechanism also exists
within the European Union, in particular in European law. In
the case of the impending bankruptcy, the European Commis-
sion facilitates a second chance for entrepreneurs (European
Commission (2011)). Thus, bankruptcy is also not the ap-
propriate definition of business failure within this thesis.
Following the presented line of reasoning I align myself
with a less-broad definition of business failure in accordance
with Cope (2011) and Ucbasaran et al. (2013). In this the-
sis, I define business failure as an event where a business ex-
periences tremendous negative developments in revenues and
costs and is threatened by bankruptcy. In the following para-
graphs, the business failure process from the actual event to
the outcomes will be described. A Summary of the process is
provided in Figure 1.
After the business failure event, the entrepreneur faces
difficulties or issues referred to as costs of failure (Ang
(1991); Cope (2011); Shepherd et al. (2009); Ucbasaran
et al. (2013)). Cope (2011) refers to the “aftermath” phase.
As depicted in Figure 1, the entrepreneur’s life is affected
in six different spheres, namely on a financial, emotional,
physiological, social, professional and entrepreneurial level
(Cope (2011)).
After the business failed, financial costs of failure oc-
cur as the entrepreneur lacks a regular income and may
face considerable debts, leading to financial distress (e.g.
Ang (1991); Cope (2011); Shepherd et al. (2009)). Cop-
ing with business failure and experiencing financial is-
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Figure 1: The Business Failure Process (Source: Own illustration based on Cope (2011) and Ucbasaran et al. (2013))
sues affects the entrepreneur’s emotional state and re-
sults in emotional costs of failure (e.g. Cope (2011);
Shepherd et al. (2009); Ucbasaran et al. (2013)). The emo-
tional state of the entrepreneur is described by anxiety and
fears due to uncertainty and unemployment. Consequently,
the failed entrepreneur suffers from follow-up physiologi-
cal distress e.g. high blood pressure or anxiety attacks (e.g.
Cope (2011); Shepherd and Cardon (2009); Ucbasaran et al.
(2013)). The emotional and thus also the physiological costs
of failure are enhanced by the entrepreneur’s social responsi-
bility. Business failure may also lead to unemployment of em-
ployees or even bankruptcy of employees and network part-
ners (e.g. Carroll and Shabana (2010); Cochran and Wood
(1984); Cope (2011); Ucbasaran et al. (2013)). Through the
environment’s changed perception of the entrepreneur, social
costs of failure occur (Cope (2011)). The perception of the
entrepreneur by the professional environment also shifts and
several authors (e.g. Cope (2011); Ucbasaran et al. (2009);
Ucbasaran et al. (2010)) propose that the entrepreneur has
difficulties in finding any professional follow-up opportu-
nity and therefore is affected by professional costs of failure.
Lastly, business failure influences an individual’s perception
of entrepreneurship and makes him or her usually less confi-
dent. The interest in starting a new business diminishes and
thus the entrepreneur pays entrepreneurial costs of failure
(e.g. Cope (2011); Deakin (1972); Kernis et al. (1989)).
At the same time or slightly after the occurrence of costs
of failure, it is commonly agreed that the entrepreneur makes
sense and learns something out of business failure (e.g.
Cope (2003); Cope (2011); Corbett (2005); Deakins and
Freel (1998); Politis (2005); Shepherd (2003); Shepherd
et al. (2009); Ucbasaran et al. (2013)). After stepping back
from the business failure event, the entrepreneur has the
possibility to objectively reflect on it (Cope (2011)). The
reflection or sensemaking process is described according to
three phases. First the events are scanned, then interpreted
and finally learning occurs (Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991);
Thomas et al. (1993); Ucbasaran et al. (2013)). Particu-
larly, entrepreneurial learning takes place (e.g. Box et al.
(1993); Lamont (1972); Politis (2005); Ronstadt (1989);
Sapienza and Grimm (1997)). Entrepreneurial learning can
be described as a continuous process over the lifetime of an
entrepreneur throughout which start-up, management and
critical or drawback experiences broaden and positively in-
fluence the entrepreneur’s knowledge and strategic decision-
making (Politis (2005)). Especially, coping with and learning
from problems is the key for improvement (Deakins (1996)).
Numerous authors (e.g. Cope (2003, 2005); Cope and Watts
(2000); Costello (1996); Deakins and Freel (1998); Deakins
et al. (2000); Deakins et al. (2002); Nicolini and Mesnar
(1995); Rae and Carswell (2000); Sullivan (2000)) empha-
size the power of critical events such as a breakdown of the
organization, discontinuation of entrepreneurial activities
and non-linear events for entrepreneurial learning. There-
fore, it is assumed that business failure is a clear signal for
the entrepreneur that something went wrong (Ucbasaran
et al. (2013)) and motivates him or her to find, indicate and
learn from made mistakes (Politis and Gabrielsson (2009);
Shepherd (2003); Stokes and Blackburn (2002)), which con-
stitutes entrepreneurial learning (Sitkin (1992)). Critically
reflecting and evolving from business failure may result in
a positive development of the entrepreneur and a more suc-
cessful subsequent business (Cope (2011); Politis (2005);
Rerup (2005); Ucbasaran et al. (2009); Ucbasaran et al.
(2013); Westhead et al. (2005);). Thus, the entrepreneur is
able to recover from business failure (Cope (2011); Shepherd
et al. (2009); Ucbasaran et al. (2013)).
After sensemaking, learning and recovery, the entrepreneur
A. K. Bauer / Junior Management Science 1 (2016) 32-6036
is said to show cognitive and behavioral outcomes. Despite
the expectation that business failure causes the entrepreneur
to resign from entrepreneurial activity, entrepreneurs are de-
scribed as optimistic and generally interested in being self-
employed (Singh et al. (2014); Ucbasaran et al. (2010)).
Therefore, an entrepreneur may have the aspiration to en-
gage in entrepreneurial activities again, restart and found
a new, subsequent business (Hessels et al. (2011); Madsen
and Desai (2010); Singh et al. (2014); Stokes and Black-
burn (2002); Ucbasaran et al. (2013)). Optimism is en-
compassed by cognitive outcomes of business failure, which
are not tangible. Thus, being optimistic about a follow-up
entrepreneurial activity corresponds to a cognitive outcome
(Cope (2011); Ucbasaran et al. (2010); Ucbasaran et al.
(2013)). The actions taken to restart and establish a sub-
sequent business however are a behavioral outcome out of
business failure. Entrepreneurs are assumed to learn from
the business failure event and change their strategic behav-
ior. Consequently, it is also assumed that due to behavioral
outcomes a subsequent business shows changes and improve-
ments (e.g. Politis (2005); Rerup (2005); Shepherd et al.
(2009); Westhead et al. (2005); Ucbasaran et al. (2013)).
2.2. Business Model Design Concept
In 1957, the term business model first appeared in an aca-
demic article, as some real world influence factors, which
need to be taken into account when developing a business
game for training purposes (Bellman et al. (1957); DaSilva
and Trkman (2014)). But only since the mid/end 1990s, the
relevance and high attraction of the topic business models
developed with the emergence of the Internet and conse-
quently the development of electronic businesses (e.g. Demil
and Lecocq (2010); Ghaziani and Ventresca (2005); Mor-
ris et al. (2005); Shafer et al. (2005); Zott et al. (2011)).
Dot-com firms began to use the term business model in their
annual reports, business plans or websites to attract fund-
ing. Over the years, the term also spread in other business
sectors (Shafer et al. (2005)). In addition, research on busi-
ness models was conducted in research fields grouped around
e-business and information technology; strategy, in particu-
lar value creation, competitive advantage and firm perfor-
mance; and innovation and technology management (Zott
et al. (2011)). Thus, the topic business models emerged in
academic research, practically oriented studies and real-life
businesses (Zott et al. (2011); Shafer et al. (2005); DaSilva
& Trkman, 2010).
Even though, the topic of business models developed as
one of the most well-known, popular and fashionable re-
search fields, the actual meaning and understanding of a
business model is unclear and diverse (DaSilva & Trkman,
2010; George and Bock (2011); Linder and Cantrell (2000);
Schneider and Spieth (2013); Zott et al. (2011)). Thus,
numerous definitions and different approaches emerged
(e.g. Amit and Zott (2001); Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart
(2010); Chesbrough and Rosenbloom (2002); Johnson et al.
(2008); Magretta (2002); Morris et al. (2005); Osterwalder
and Pigneur (2004); Teece (2010)).
Nevertheless, the question arises what is a business
model? As depicted by several authors (e.g. Teece (2010);
Zott et al. (2011); Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010);
Demil and Lecocq (2010)) a business model generally shows
how a firm creates, distributes and captures value. A busi-
ness model is a “hypothesis about what customers want, and
how an enterprise can best meet those needs, and get paid
for doing so” (Teece (2007): 1329). Thus, some authors
refer to the business model concept as a “blueprint of how
a company does business” (Osterwalder et al. (2005): 4) or
a “recipe - that fulfills important functions such as enabling
description and classification” (Demil and Lecocq (2010):
228). It is a concept that differs from strategy and tactic
concepts (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart (2010); DaSilva &
Trkman, 2013) but the business model reflects a firm’s re-
alized strategy, thus represents executive’s strategic choices
and their consequences (Shafer et al. (2005); Casadesus-
Masanell and Ricart (2010)). However, the business model
goes beyond the actual firm and also considers the link-
age between the focal firm and its activities with suppliers,
network partners and customers (Daft and Lewin (1993);
Dunbar and Starbuck (2006); Magretta (2002); McGrath
(2010); Morris et al. (2005); Osterwalder et al. (2005);
Teece (2010); Zott and Amit (2010)). Zott et al. (2011)
summarize similarities among business model literature ac-
cording to four core items of the business model concept:
the business model is a universally applicable new unit of
analysis; it “emphasize[s] a system-level, holistic approach
to explaining how firms do business”; the business model fo-
cuses on activities between a focal firm and its partners and
thus also encompasses “boundary-spanning activities”; and
it “seeks to explain both value creation and value capture”
(Zott et al. (2011): 1019; 1038).
There are numerous so-called business model meta-
models, which show different elements and relationships
that build a business (e.g. Demil and Lecocq (2010); Os-
terwalder and Pigneur (2004); Osterwalder et al. (2005)).
In the field of entrepreneurship, the updated meta-model
namely the business model canvas by Osterwalder and
Pigneur (2010) received great attention due to its practical
use, as entrepreneurs can easily use the business model can-
vas as a base to visualize possible realized business strategies
(e.g. Blank and Dorf (2012)). However, the strong manage-
rial focus and management tool character (Zott et al. (2011))
do not necessarily oblige academic research.
Within this thesis, the business model concept by Amit
and Zott (2001), who “[...] conceptualize a firm’s business
model as a system of interdependent activities that tran-
scends the focal firm and spans its boundaries” (Amit and
Zott (2001): 216), will be used as a unit of analysis. There
are two reasons for this choice. First, in contrast to most
business models, which emerged from a managerial back-
ground (George and Bock (2011); Spieth et al. (2014)), the
business model concept shows a high embeddedness in well-
established theories (Amit and Zott (2001); Morris et al.
(2005)). Due to the dependency on theoretical approaches,
adjustments to the initial model from 2001 focusing on e-
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Businesses were possible and allowed for the emergence of
a universally applicable business model concept (Amit and
Zott (2012); Zott and Amit (2010)). Second, Zott and Amit
(2010) and Zott and Amit (2013) established their business
model concept from an activity system perspective. The
“business model depicts the content, structure, and gover-
nance of transactions designed so as to create value through
the exploitation of business opportunities” (Amit and Zott
(2001): 511). The clear structure according to three ele-
ments and the inclusion of activities spanning also industry’s
boundaries allow for an analysis of an entrepreneur’s behav-
ior from an objective point of view.
In particular, Amit and Zott (2001) consider four well-
known and well-established theories, which focus on how to
gain and capture value. These four theories are: the theory
of creative destruction by Schumpeter (Schumpeter (1942)),
the resource-based view (e.g. Barney (1991)), strategic net-
work theory (e.g. Dyer and Singh (1998)), and transaction
costs economics (Williamson (1975)). In 1934, Schumpeter
introduced Schumpeterian innovation, which states that a
firm can gain value out of always being innovative and in-
troduce new products, processes, organization, etc. In this
context, the novel combination of resources or processes is
the key towards innovation and thus value creation. Hence,
novelty is one of the four sources of value creation in the
business model.
The resource-based view assumes that resources are het-
erogeneous, immobile, scarce, long lasting and difficult to
be traded or to imitate. Consequently, when a firm com-
bines resources and capabilities in a unique way, a competi-
tive advantage can be achieved and value creation takes place
(e.g. Amit and Schoemaker (1993); Barney (1991); Penrose
(1959); Peteraf (1993); Wernerfelt (1984)). Barney (1991)
explains the resource-based view according to his proposed
VRIO framework. If a firm’s resource or capability is valu-
able, rare and costly to imitate and if the firm is organized to
capture value, then “it is implementing a value creating strat-
egy not simultaneously being implemented by any current
potential competitor and when these other firms are unable
to duplicate the benefits of this strategy” (Barney (1991):
102). A sustained competitive advantage is achieved. In
accordance with the resource-based view, complementarities
among resources, capabilities and networks and the impor-
tance of the interrelationship are highlighted as they are cre-
ating, increasing and capturing value (Amit and Schoemaker
(1993); Amit and Zott (2001)). Thus, complementarities are
a potential source of value creation within a firm’s business
model (Amit and Zott (2001)).
Furthermore, Amit and Zott (2001) consider transaction
cost economics, which was mainly developed by Williamson
(Williamson (1975), Williamson (1979); Williamson (1983)).
Williamson states, “a transaction occurs when a good or
service is transferred across a technologically separable in-
terface. One stage of processing or assembly activity termi-
nates, and another begins” (Williamson (1983): 104). Given
the circumstances of complexity and uncertainty of transac-
tions as well as asymmetric information and opportunism,
the transactions might be costly and inefficient (Williamson
(1975)). Thus, Williamson suggests that choices on trans-
actions shall aim for efficiency and the ultimate goal to
decrease transaction costs to a minimum to actually create
value (Amit and Zott (2001); Williamson (1975)). Conse-
quently, the third source of value in the business model by
Amit and Zott (2001) is efficiency.
Lastly, Amit and Zott (2001) consider strategic networks
theory. Strategic networks are defined as “stable inter-
organizational ties, which are strategically important to
participating firms. They may take the form of strategic
alliances, joint ventures, long-term buyer–supplier partner-
ships, and other ties” (Gulati et al. (2000): 203) . Amit and
Zott (2001) emphasize the importance of strategic networks
as they strengthen the competitive position of a firm, dimin-
ish uncertainty, may lead to access to important assets and
the firm might be able to learn from their network partners,
including suppliers and customers. Thus, a firm is able to
gain value from those strategic networks. Amit and Zott
(2001) refer to a lock-in effect, where loyalty and customer
retention play a crucial role.
Zott and Amit (Zott and Amit (2010), see also Amit and
Zott (2001); Amit and Zott (2012)) explain that a firm’s busi-
ness model is build by three design elements, namely the
content element, structure element and governance element.
The content element basically describes a firm’s offerings.
Exchanged goods, services or information are displayed. In
addition, the content element informs about all capabilities,
which are needed for an exchange. The structure element fo-
cuses on all actors involved in the exchange of goods, services
or information. It describes how they are linked to each other
and the firm. Information is provided on exchange mecha-
nisms and the importance of activities with involved parties,
such as network partners and customers. The governance el-
ement provides information on control mechanisms within
the firm and other agents or parties and how they are moti-
vated to perform expected activities, such as incentives.
Within the business model elements value can be cre-
ated and captured through four centric orientations based
on the presented theories. Amit and Zott (2001) state that
there is a novelty-centered business model design based on
Schumpeterian innovation; a complementarities-centered
business model design based on the resource-based view; an
efficiency-centered business model design based on transac-
tion cost economics and a lock-in-centered business model
design based on strategic network theory. The business
model by Amit and Zott (2001) is summarized in Figure 2.
3. Methodology
In the following Chapter 3.1, first the overall research
design will be presented and a line of reasoning will be
drawn to explain why this particular research design was
chosen. Afterwards, Chapter 3.2 will describe how data was
collected. In particular, the choice of cases will be explained
and sources of information will be named. Chapter 3.3 fo-
cuses on data analysis. The analysis approach in accordance
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Figure 2: Business Model Concept (Source: Own illustration based on Amit and Zott (2001).)
with profound theory on methodology will be explained and
eventually summarized in Figure 3.
3.1. Research Design
To be able to fully understand the learning process af-
ter a business failed, Cope (2011) suggests a qualitative re-
search design. Qualitative research supports the search for
meanings and helps to better understand processes and ex-
periences rather than measuring effects (Jack and Anderson
(2002)). In addition, qualitative research has the strength to
uncover and to understand processes that are deeply embed-
ded in individuals and organizations (Bluhm et al. (2011)).
As described in Figure 1, the business failure process is in-
deed deeply embedded and solely connected to one partic-
ular organization or even one individual, namely the en-
trepreneur. To answer the research questions, it is essential to
gain in-depth information on the entrepreneur’s experiences
and investigate the complexity of entrepreneurial processes
particularly the business failure process. Thus, a qualitative
research design seems to be appropriate.
Studying “real people, real problems, and real organiza-
tions” is especially helpful in a rather new research field (Ed-
mondson and McManus (2007)). Phenomena or events that
are new to the academic world or where so far only little
research exists, can be analyzed particularly well by going
in the field (Edmondson and McManus (2007); Eisenhardt
(1989); Wright et al. (1988)). To be able to detect certain
mechanisms or patterns among real organizations, which ex-
perienced failure and the foundation of a subsequent busi-
ness, a multiple-case approach is deemed appropriate as sug-
gested by Yin (2009).
However, there are numerous approaches how to col-
lect and analyze data from multiple cases. Cope (2011)
follows an interpretative phenomological analysis as a re-
search design, which is very prominent in the realm of en-
trepreneurship. Phenomological interpretative analysis fo-
cuses on an individual and his or her personal perceptions
and the researcher’s interpretation and perception of the in-
terview. Therefore, the researcher shall have a conversa-
tional talk with the interviewee (Smith et al. (1999)). The
grounded theory approach developed by Glaser and Strauss
(1967) also refrains from pre-formulated questions and a
structured interview to collect data (Glaser (1992); Glaser
and Strauss (1967)). Despite their prominence, due to the
approaches’ loose structure of data collection and data anal-
ysis, as well as interpretative and micro-level design, both
are not suitable when analyzing processes such as strate-
gic changes that happen for a longer period of time (Cope
(2011); Langley (1999)).
In contrast, there is Eisenhardt’s (Eisenhardt (1989)) the-
ory building approach. She suggests a more structured data
analysis process and promotes defined constructs during data
collection and analysis. Thus, the theoretical background can
be taken into account when developing interview questions
and choosing an appropriate sample. To answer the research
questions it is particularly essential to ask concrete questions
on the business failure process and on the business model
design of the initial, failed business and subsequent business.
Furthermore, the theory building approach is especially good
for new research fields. Consequently, the theory building
approach by Eisenhardt (1989) seems to be the best suitable
approach in the context of the thesis.
3.2. Data Collection
As Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) point out, there are
challenges when it comes to the selection of suitable cases
to build a theory. In particular it is criticized that the sam-
ple selection is not representative and thus no general rule
can be drawn from the cases. However, the cases are chosen
to develop a theoretical approach and not to test formulated
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hypotheses. Therefore, theoretical sampling is appropriate
when building theory. Theoretical sampling means, that no
random choice takes place, but cases are chosen according
to their linkage with observable circumstances (Eisenhardt
(1989); Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007)). Within this the-
sis, five cases were selected assimilated with the following
four criteria, which develop out of the theoretical background
(Chapter 2) and the research questions. The interview part-
ners are:
1. Entrepreneurs who experienced failure, and conse-
quently
2. terminated their initial business (corresponding with
the definition of business failure in Chapter 2.1);
3. started a subsequent business; and
4. play(ed) a central role in both the failed business and
the subsequent business.
Criterion four was included to ensure comparability
among cases and to learn more about the entrepreneurial
learning process of entrepreneurs. However, variations in
terms of founding teams were allowed. Nevertheless, the
central founder of each case needed to be available for an
in-depth interview.
To persuade entrepreneurs to participate in an in-depth
interview, it is helpful and important to guarantee that they
are not embarrassed. Discretion and anonymity are the key
to receive honest and open answers as well as proprietary
information (Gioia et al. (2013)). It is important to protect
the entrepreneur’s integrity, as business failure is certainly a
sensitive and emotional topic to talk about (Cope (2011);
Ucbasaran et al. (2013)). Therefore, any data, which ex-
poses the interviewed individual or the analyzed business,
will be excluded. Only information, which is relevant for un-
derstanding the case and answering the research questions,
will be presented.
The data was sourced from the respective entrepreneur
being considered as key informant for each case (Kumar et al.
(1993)). To gain in-depth insights from key informants about
their experience with business failure and founding a subse-
quent business, a semi-structured interview design was cho-
sen as suggested by Gioia et al. (2013). The advantage of
a semi-structured interview is that it helps “to obtain both
retrospective and real-time accounts by those people experi-
encing the phenomenon of theoretical interest” (Gioia et al.
(2013): 19). At the same time, some structure enabled the
interviewer to guide the interviewee along the main topics
of interest, which aim for answering the research questions
(Yin (2009)).
The interview questions of the semi-structured interview
followed guidelines suggested by Eisenhardt (1989), ? and
Yin (2009). Eisenhardt (1989) puts special emphasis on
personal interaction of the interviewer and the interviewee.
Thus, the interview should assemble a personal conversation.
The interview guideline shall be flexible accordingly. Thus,
needs to be open to adjustments and changes during the in-
terview. The flexibility of the interview questions enables the
interviewer to take advantage of opportunities that come up
during the interview. Gioia et al. (2013) also emphasize flex-
ibility to ensure that there is enough room for “twists, turns,
and roller-coaster rides” during the interview (Gioia et al.
(2013): 19). Furthermore, the first draft of the interview
guideline shall relate to the research question and theoret-
ical implications, on which research is based (Gioia et al.
(2013)). Yin (2009), points out that during the interview the
interviewer is entering the “real-world”. Therefore, the inter-
viewer faces real behaviors, emotions and might be forced to
change questions during the interview or adapt to the en-
vironment. Consequently, Yin (2009) also emphasizes the
conversational nature of the interview and suggests an open-
ended interview design. Thus, I designed a flexible (Gioia
et al. (2013)), open-ended and conversational guideline (Yin
(2009)) for the respective interviews, which were conducted
in personal interactions (Eisenhardt (1989)) and lasted one
hour in average.
Additional information on each case was drawn from
publicly available sources such as “archives, field obser-
vation, media documentation, etc.” (Gioia et al. (2013):
19). Multiple data sources help to better understand the
real-world organization of interest (Gioia et al. (2013); Yin
(2009)). Therefore, the data from interviews was triangu-
lated as far as possible. However, it was especially difficult
with respect to the failed business to use websites or archive
date since most former websites were shut down. Thus,
publicly available information was used such as financial
statements or newspaper articles. Data triangulation is es-
pecially important as it enhances the reliability and validity
of data collected from cases (Gibbert et al. (2008)). To fur-
ther triangulate data and thus get some general insights to
the topic, interviews were conducted with two bankruptcy
trustees. Both bankruptcy trustees are experts in the field
of business failure and restart entrepreneurs. Furthermore,
both experts were previously emphasizing the importance of
a “second-chance” for failed entrepreneurs (IHK24). These
expert interviews provided valuable information and enabled
a more holistic and objective view.
3.3. Data Analysis
Following the suggested methodological approach by
Eisenhardt (1989), the analysis of the collected data is step-
wise. First, a within-case analysis is conducted for each case
respectively, followed by a cross-case analysis. As part of the
within-case analysis and as an introduction to each case, a
detailed case description will be provided. The descriptive
write-up aims for a chronological structure. Hence, a better
overview over the cases and their key events can be ensured.
Additionally, the respective business models of the initial,
failed business and the subsequent business are displayed
(Tables 1 to 5). Overall, a description is helpful to start
processing the large amount of collected data (Eisenhardt
(1989); Gersick (1988); Pettigrew (1990)). The case his-
tories as well as the business model descriptions are based
on information gained from the interview and additional
sources as specified above.
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After the descriptive part, the within-case analysis itself
is divided into four steps. Steps one to three consider the
business model elements, content, structure and governance.
For each element the strategic orientation of the initial, failed
business and subsequent business will be analyzed and com-
pared. The fourth step draws an overall conclusion on how
the business model of the initial, failed business and subse-
quent business differ. Thus, in the within-case analysis it will
be possible to detect similarities and differences between the
initial, failed business’s and the subsequent business’s busi-
ness model design. Consequently, it can be seen if a change in
business model design happened which is assumed to corre-
spond to a behavioral outcome and thus implies failure-based
entrepreneurial learning.
After the within-case analysis, Eisenhardt (1989) pro-
poses to conduct a cross-case analysis and “search for pat-
terns” (Eisenhardt (1989): 541). The “search for patterns”
prevents researchers from looking at data from one angle
only and missing or misinterpreting important findings.
Thus, the researcher is prevented from relying too much
on initial impressions. The cross-case analysis supports the
reliability of theory building and aims for novel findings
(Eisenhardt (1989)). To find the different patterns, the pat-
tern matching techniques suggested by Trochim (1989) and
Yin (2009) will be used. Precisely, an observed pattern is
matched with an expected pattern based on theory (Trochim
(1989); Yin (2009)).
In her paper, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests three different
tactics to search for cross-case patterns. The first tactic fol-
lows along different categories. Usually the different cat-
egories are based on theoretical approaches that are con-
sidered as theoretical background. In alignment with the
presented dimensions or categories of the theoretical back-
ground, it is possible to look for similarities and differences
among the cases for each category or dimension. The sec-
ond tactic suggested, goes the other way around. First, one
looks for different pairs of cases, which are quite alike and
then a comparison of the different pairs among each other
and the detection of similarities and differences are possible.
A third tactic is to divide the data analysis process by data
sources. This attempt can be chosen when there are several
researchers. Each researcher can have a look at each differ-
ent data source and interpret each data source separately.
Within this thesis, I followed along two of Eisenhardt’s
suggested tactics, namely the first and the second tactic.
Therefore, I first selected categories based on presented the-
ory and then looked for similarities and differences among
the five cases. The selected categories are based on the
business failure process developed by Cope (2011) and
Ucbasaran et al. (2013) (Figure 1) and the business model
concept by Amit and Zott (2001) (Figure 2). The cate-
gory drawn from the business model concept is the business
model conceptualization and in particularly considers the
three business model elements, content, structure and gov-
ernance. To follow the second tactic suggested by Eisenhardt
(1989), I compared the 5 cases pairwise to be able to look for
and recognize more subtle similarities and differences, which
are not detected by a category comparison. In this context,
direct quotes from the interviewees provide rich data.
In the cross-case analysis, the expert interviews play a ma-
jor role. The opinions of experts were used to reflect, enrich
and triangulate findings of the cross-case analysis. Conse-
quently, the cross-case analysis resembles an iterative pro-
cess. Figure 3 illustrates the methodological approach of
the analysis. An overview over the multiple-case design is
provided and shows the ten businesses as an embedded unit
of analysis and the expert interviews as an enhancement in
terms of contextualization.
4. Analysis
As described in the previous chapter and in accordance
with Eisenhardt (1989), first a within-case analysis will be
conducted. The individual comparison of the initial, failed
business and the subsequent business aims for answering the
first research question. The second research question will
then be answered in a cross-case analysis, which aims for the
development of propositions. The development of proposi-
tions is conducted according to pattern-matching techniques
and tactics as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989).
4.1. Within-case Analysis
In the following, the five derived cases will be presented
individually. For each case a detailed description of the time-
line of events is provided and a summary of events is shown
in Figures 4 to 8. Within the timeline, the entrepreneurial
history of each entrepreneur is summarized according to the
conducted interview, as well as online financial statements,
firm and career network websites. The description of the
cases begins with the initial business. How it was founded
and how it eventually experienced business failure. A first
insight to the causes of business failure is provided. Then,
the foundation process of the subsequent business presents
the last part of the description. Tables 1 to 5 show the busi-
ness models of the initial, failed business and the subsequent
business for each case. Information on the content, structure
and governance element is given, which helps to compare the
business models of the initial, failed business and subsequent
business case by case. Differences in the business models
are pointed out and developments and changes are depicted.
Thus, for each case the question can be answered, how busi-
ness models of an entrepreneur’s failed business and the sub-
sequent business differ. The aim is to investigate whether
there are behavioral outcomes to business failure, which pro-
vide insights to entrepreneurial learning.
Case A. As a young adult, entrepreneur A decided to fol-
low a practice-oriented career path and did an apprentice-
ship. After the apprenticeship, entrepreneur A started to
work for an international operating company and was sent
abroad several times. However, his dream was to be self-
employed. Therefore, he eventually passed his master’s ex-
amination and thereby accomplished the necessary qualifi-
cation to be able to set up his own business. Entrepreneur A
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Figure 3: Case Study Research Design (Source: Own Illustration based on Yin (2009) (50))
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established business A1 in the skilled craft and trades indus-
try in 1990. During the first couple of month in operation,
business A1 changed the focus from solely selling products to
offering crafting services, which were highly requested dur-
ing the time in this specific area. Consequently, business A1
hit it off right away and entrepreneur A described the be-
ginning time as very successful. Business A1 also benefitted
from the well-connected employees, who were already in-
teracting and connected with potential customers. After 13
years in business, entrepreneur A decided to transfer busi-
ness activities to a potential successor. However, the busi-
ness succession approach was unsuccessful, which lead to a
severe crisis of business A1 and the business was in need of
restructuring and reorganization to be able to continue oper-
ating. But entrepreneur A decided against restructuring his
business and closed down business A1. Nevertheless, he was
eager to continue his legacy and restarted business activity
with the establishment of business A2 immediately in 2005.
Business A2 is also established in the skilled craft and trades
industry and offers the same products and services as before.
As it can be seen in Figure 4, entrepreneur A did not ex-
perience or even allowed for any transition time between
the failure of business A1 and the foundation of business
A2. There were also no changes in terms of employees, cus-
tomers, organizational and legal structures or business ac-
tivities. Nowadays, business A2 already exists for 10 years.
In Table 1, the business model elements of the initial, failed
business A1 and the subsequent business A2 are depicted.
Comparing the business models of business A1 and busi-
ness A2 generally, it becomes obvious that they are quite sim-
ilar. Having a closer look, the content element of business A1
has a lock-in-centered design as the offered customized hy-
brid solutions aim for long-term customer relationships, char-
acterizing a lock-in effect. As there are no relevant changes
from business A1 to business A2 in the content element,
also business A2 has a lock-in-centered content element. En-
trepreneur A explained that he still benefits from customer
relationships, which have been established at the beginning
of business A1.
Considering the structure element of business A1, en-
trepreneur A was eager to build on long-lasting customer
relationships. Therefore, he made use out of existing cus-
tomer relations of his employees and relied on his employee’s
word-of-mouth customer acquisition strategy. In addition,
entrepreneur A was interested in building networks and he
also made use out of existing networks of his employees who
were well-connected in the region. The importance of net-
works and long-term customer relationships indicates a lock-
in-centered structure element of business A1. In comparison,
within business A2 there are no active engagements in cus-
tomer acquisition or network building. Entrepreneur A ex-
plains that the focus lies on maintaining existing customer
and network relations. Thus, even though some changes
were made in the structure element, value is still created and
captured through a lock-in-centered design.
Also the governance element shows a lock-in-centered
design. The informality of the working environment was
designed to motivate employees and to implicitly create a
loyalty mechanism. As described previously, there were no
changes in employees from business A1 to business A2 which
leads to the assumption that employees are indeed loyal to
entrepreneur A. Furthermore, due to the informal character
of governance in general, a community concept is promoted
which aims for loyalty among network partners and long-
lasting employment relationships. In comparison to business
A1, the governance element of business A2 shows no relevant
changes. Therefore, it can be concluded that business A1 as
well as business A2 are designed to create and capture value
through a lock-in-centered business model design.
The similarity between the two business models of busi-
ness A1 and business A2 and the fact that business A2 already
operates for 10 years leads to the conclusion that the business
model design actually works. Entrepreneur A is successful
in creating and capturing value through a lock-in-centered
business model design. However, as mentioned above, busi-
ness A1 failed due to an unsuccessful business succession.
Therefore, the success of the business is highly dependent
on entrepreneur A and the business model design can only
be successful with him being involved in business activities.
For example, entrepreneur A mentioned that customers are
loyal to him, not to the business itself. Consequently, en-
trepreneur A himself was and is the value-driver of business
A1 and business A2. He further stated that there is still no po-
tential successor. This leads to the assumption that business
A2 cannot survive in the long-run as proven by the business
failure of business A1. Despite the fact that business A1 did
not survive and failed, entrepreneur A does not accept the
failure and denies and ignores the fact that he cannot work
and keep up the business forever. Thus, he is not able and
also not willing to learn something out of the business fail-
ure event and change his strategic behavior. Consequently, he
shows no cognitive and behavioral learning outcomes. Also
organizational learning did not take place as can be proven
by the similarity between business models of business A1 and
business model of business A2. Concluding, entrepreneurial
learning did not take place in case A and even though busi-
ness A2 is currently running well, eventually it will probably
fail without a successful business succession.
Case B. Entrepreneur B describes himself as a serial en-
trepreneur. He has a well-developed and extensive academic
background as well as widespread practical experience. Par-
allel to his academic education, he was engaged in real-world
businesses. One of the businesses he was working for had a
customer he cooperated extensively with. This particular cus-
tomer was interested in entrepreneurial activity and was ea-
ger to convince entrepreneur B to found a business together.
As entrepreneur B was also interested in entrepreneurial ac-
tivity, both of them eventually founded business B1 in the
chemical and technical industry in 1999. In the beginning,
business B1 was highly successful and experienced a positive
development. However, there were some discrepancies be-
tween the two founders in terms of how to do business in
general. In particular, they did not share the same vision and
objective on customer relationship management. There was
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Figure 4: Case A Timeline of Events
Table 1: Comparison of Business Models between Business A1 and Business A2
Business A1 Business A2
Content Content
• customized hybrid solutions and after sales ser-
vice in skilled craft and trades industry
• handicraft skills needed by employees and en-
trepreneur to be able to sell, build and install hy-
brid
• no technology or special skill needed to use hy-
brid solutions
no relevant changes
Structure Structure
• word-of-mouth as basis for acquiring customers;
use of employee’s network relations and local
insider-knowledge to acquire customers; equal
treatment of customers; flexibility related to ful-
filling customer demands; customer satisfaction
is of highest priority
• making use of individual, professional networks
• acquisition of new customers less important and
only done by chance; main focus on existing
• lock-in effect of previous networks
Governance Governance
• no specific security mechanisms to protect firm-
specific knowledge
• highly informal coordination mechanisms
• informal relations with network partners to pro-
mote a long-term relationship
• high independence and self-directedness of em-
ployees; trust in employees; continuous develop-
ment of employee’s skills is promoted
no relevant changes
also only little communication between the two founders as
each was responsible for a different section of business activ-
ity. After four years of existence, the volume of orders de-
creased significantly and business B1 experienced a heavy
crisis. Business B1 did not survive the crisis and five years
after its initial foundation business B1 was not able to carry
out any business activities and was threatened by bankruptcy.
Both founders then decided to not continue business B1 and
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go their own ways.
After the business failure event, entrepreneur B was how-
ever eager to build on what was left (the business idea and
some manufacturing plants) and entered a 2 year period of
reflection, transition and renovation, depicted in Figure 5.
With the help of a new business partner and a new investor,
entrepreneur B established business B2 in the chemical in-
dustry. Especially in the beginning, business B2 was not that
successful, had financial troubles and was dependent on ev-
ery single order. The business failure of business B1 still af-
fected entrepreneur B and thus also the subsequent business
B2. However, after getting over these initial issues, business
B2 developed and became profitable. Today, entrepreneur
B is head of three operative businesses and five peripheral
businesses which all are established under the roof of busi-
ness B2. Table 2 shows closer insights on the business models
of business B1 and business B2.
Generally, business B1 can be described as a business that
aims for value creation through strategic networks and thus
shows a lock-in centered business model design. In particu-
lar, the content element of business B1 is build around cus-
tomized chemical and technical products, which indicates a
lock-in effect of customers, due to their dependency on the
business through customization. Comparing the content ele-
ment of business B1 and business B2, there are only slight
changes, as business activity is now only focusing on cus-
tomized chemical products. Entrepreneur B explains that the
second business activity was not profitable already in busi-
ness B1. Consequently, entrepreneur decided for only follow-
ing along customized chemical products. Overall the content
element of business B2 constitutes lock-in-centered value cre-
ation and capture.
Concerning the structure element, business B1 shows
some characteristics of a lock-in-centered design. Business
B1 was proactively searching for long-term network partners
and was eager to cooperate closely with them and its cus-
tomers. Trust and cooperation play key roles. Especially the
close cooperation with customers during the production pro-
cess caused innovation and lead to new patents. Thus, value
was created and captured through a lock-in effect. However,
interferences with a lock-in-centered structure element can
be depicted as customers were treated pretentiously dur-
ing the acquisition process. The initial business partner of
entrepreneur B and co-founder was responsible for the ac-
quisition process. The business partner was not interested
in long-term customer relationships and did not see their
benefit. Entrepreneur B further described his business part-
ner as megalomaniac. Ultimately, the megalomania lead to
the happenings that business B1 built additional production
plants, whereas the volume of orders declined. These events
lead to a crisis, an approaching bankruptcy and eventually to
business failure. Therefore, some change needed to happen.
The structure element of business B2 shows a consistent lock-
in-centered design. Nowadays, entrepreneur B is responsible
for the whole interaction with customers and is eager to en-
gage in long-term customer relationships. Business B2 has
no active acquisition process of new customers or network
partners but relies on long-term customer and network re-
lationships. Having the overall goal to create and capture
value through long-term relationships, entrepreneur B was
able to avoid interferences with a lock-in-centered structure
element when establishing business B2.
The governance element of business B1 also is obviously
designed to create value through a lock-in-centered design.
Patents protected firm-specific knowledge and manager-level
employees were highly involved in the business activity and
thus were intrinsically motivated to work for business B1. In
consequence, an implicit loyalty program is employed. Fur-
thermore, the community concept, which was implemented
to work with customers and network partners, was a base for
lock-in value creation. As there were no interferences with
a lock-in-centered design and governance mechanisms were
working well, entrepreneur B did not change the governance
element for business B2.
Concluding, after business B1 failed, entrepreneur B ex-
perienced a two-year reflection and renovation phase. Af-
ter the two years, entrepreneur B founded business B2 with
the help of a new investor and a new business partner, who
was previously externally engaged in business activities of
business B1. Thus, entrepreneur B benefitted from external
and internal advice when analyzing the business failure and
working on problems. With the support of these two, en-
trepreneur B was able to change the business model design in
the way that he erased factors, which interfered with a lock-
in-centered business model design. Consequently, business
B2 is clearly designed to derive value from a lock-in-centered
business model as can be seen in Table 2. Consequently, it can
be concluded that there was indeed a change in the business
model design from business B1 to business B2. Recent suc-
cesses and the nine-year existence of business B2 prove the
positive change. Especially the changed behavior towards
customers indicates behavioral outcomes and entrepreneur B
generally emphasized the learning effect from business fail-
ure. He learned a life-lesson. According to entrepreneur B,
learning took place on an emotional level and nowadays he
handles things differently. Overall entrepreneurial learning
through business failure did take place.
Case C. Entrepreneur C has an academic as well as
practical-oriented background and comes from an
entrepreneurial family, which engages in business activities
in the real estate industry. Shaped and inspired by her fam-
ily, entrepreneur C decided to establish business C1 also in
the real estate industry (cooperating with the overall family
activities) in 2011. However, the overall financial situation
was difficult as there was a lack of investments, low return
on investment and financial resources were overestimated.
Also the demand for the offered service was rather low. In
addition, it was very difficult to recruit well-trained and ade-
quate personnel and thus the expected turnover could not be
reached. In consequence, business C1 went bankrupt after
2 years in operation. Due to the legal status of the business,
the bankruptcy also affected the personal financial situation.
The whole timeline of events can be seen in Figure 6.
Out of the necessity to have an income, entrepreneur C
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Figure 5: Case B Timeline of Events
Table 2: Comparison of Business Models between Business B1 and Business B2
Business B1 Business B2
Content Content
• customized chemical products and additional
technical products; no linkage between product
segments
• technical and chemical knowledge and skills nec-
essary to offer products; no skills needed to use
products
• customized chemical products only
• chemical knowledge and skills necessary to offer
product; no skills needed to use product
Structure Structure
• proactive acquisition of customers; pretentious
behavior towards customers during acquisition
process; equal treatment of customers during
production process; involvement of customers in
innovation processes
• proactive search for network partners; network
development out of personal networks and long-
term relationships through cooperation with pre-
vious suppliers and customers; network partners
involved in innovation processes
• newly established structures regarding customer
relationships; customers are generally treated as
partners; no specific customer acquisition; word-
of-mouth marketing; involvement of customers
in innovation processes
• activation of existing networks to form long-term
network relations
Governance Governance
• innovation processes protected by patent law
• informal long-term relationships with
• informal coordination mechanisms; lock-in of
white collar workers based on intrinsic incentives
• high responsibility for own actions and high de-
cision authority of white collar workers; less in-
volvement of blue collar employees
no relevant changes
founded business C2 with the support of her family imme-
diately after the bankruptcy of business C1. Business C2 is
again established in the real estate industry but now has a dif-
ferent legal form, which protects entrepreneur C’s personal
belongings. Also the scope of offered services extended. To-
day, business C2 already operates for about one year but
is still in the beginning phase. Thus, it cannot be foreseen
whether business C2 will sustain. Table 3 displays the busi-
ness models of business C1 and business C2.
Comparing the business models of business C1 and busi-
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Figure 6: Case C Timeline of Events
Table 3: Comparison of Business Models between Business C1 and Business C2
Business C1 Business C2
Content Content
• real estate services
• low information flow towards employees and
customers
• real estate services; customized concepts in con-
struction industry
• intensified exchange of information with part-
ners
Structure Structure
• proactive acquisition of customers; eye-level
treatment of customers; high flexibility for cus-
tomer demands
• few network partners acquired based on personal
networks; no perceived relevance of further de-
velopment of networks
no relevant changes
Governance Governance
• no specific security mechanisms to protect firm
specific knowledge
• no specific coordinative activities
• independent and self-directed employees; high
responsibility for own actions; access to little
business related information
• no specific security mechanisms to protect firm
specific knowledge
• technocratic coordination of business activities;
additional use of informal coordination mecha-
nisms
• independent and self-directed employees; high
responsibility for own actions; access to more
business related information
ness C2, there are some differences in business model ele-
ments. Having a closer look at the content element of busi-
ness C1, it becomes clear that it is no value-driver. It does not
aim for efficiency, a lock-in effect, makes use of complemen-
tarities nor does it introduce a novel product. The content
element of business C2 on the other hand shows changes in
terms of the offered product and transparency. Business C2
offers all kind of services around real estate, from selling the
old house to coordinating all involved parties for building a
new house, and thus offers customers the possibility to just
take their services rather than working with multiple differ-
ent businesses. The content element, in particular the offered
products, thus aims for value creation and capture through
complementarities.
The structure element of business C1 appears as the only
element that is designed to create and capture value in busi-
ness C1. It is slightly designed towards a lock-in-centered ap-
proach. Entrepreneur C stated that she tried to create long-
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term relationships with customers and make the business ap-
pealing by its flexibility for customer demands. So customers
would eventually come back. However, entrepreneur C fur-
ther explained that in the real estate business usually cus-
tomers only require a real estate agent once in a life-time.
On the other hand, entrepreneur C explained that cooperat-
ing with network partners may play a central role, e.g. own-
ers of an apartment complex might be willing to work with
a real estate agent on a long-term basis. Nevertheless, en-
trepreneur C stated that networking was not important for
business C1. Despite this explanation, the structure element
of business C2 shows no relevant changes and has a lock-in-
centered design. Entrepreneur C described the structure of
business C2 as still looking for long-term customer relation-
ships whereas the development of a professional network is
trivial. Nevertheless, entrepreneur C admitted that especially
with the new content focus of business C2, networks might
be highly beneficial.
The governance element of business C1 is also not the
main source of value creation. As presented in Table 3, there
are no specific mechanisms employed in the governance el-
ement, which could be identified as value-drivers. However,
the governance element of business C2 shows changes. It is
designed to create value through efficiency. Regular meetings
are taking place in business C2 to coordinate and better coop-
erate with employees and make the business more efficient.
Higher information flow towards employees additionally de-
creases inefficient decision processes. Also costs for security
mechanisms are kept low.
Overall there is only a slight tendency towards a lock-in
centered business model design in business C1. However,
the lock-in-centered business model design seems to not fit
with the real estate branch and there is no consistency among
business model elements. Business C2 shows some improve-
ments in terms of the overall value creation and capture, as
the content element is designed to create value through com-
plementarities. However, the structure element does not sup-
port the complementarities-centered design but strives for a
lock-in effect of customers. Furthermore, the governance el-
ement shows improvements as it is designed to be efficient.
But there is certainly a lack of consistency among the differ-
ent business model elements of business C2 too. Conclud-
ing, it has to be admitted, that changes did happen after the
business failure of business C1. However, changes and im-
provements within the business model elements appear to
be random. Entrepreneur C stated that the failure of business
C1 was caused by environmental, external developments and
the actual business idea and activity was successful. There-
fore, it can be assumed that improvements and changes were
not intended but happened on a trial and error basis. In con-
sequence, the business failure event did not lead to consec-
utive, respective behavioral outcomes and failure-based en-
trepreneurial learning.
Case D. Entrepreneur D has an academic background
with special focus on the IT sector, in which he started his
career. However, his dream was to have more influence on
business activities and thus he was interested in being self-
employed. Business D1 was established in the IT sector by a
founding team with the support of an investor in 2007. Busi-
ness D1 had five key customers, which were the main sources
of revenue. Thus, business D1 was highly dependent on these
customers. In addition, the cost structure of business D1 was
not beneficial and usually costs exceeded revenues. Conse-
quently, it was obvious that something had to change. There-
fore, the founding team aimed for developing a new product.
However, the development process was rather slow and at
the same time one of the key customers quit the long-term
working relationship. The missing revenues lead to a major
decrease of personnel and a major financial crisis. Therefore,
the investor offered business D1 more money but asked for
85% of the company’s shares. The founding team did not
accept the offer and decided to not actively continue busi-
ness activities. Figure 7 summarizes the concrete timeline of
events.
As soon as the decision was made to decline the offer and
rather give up business D1, entrepreneur D started to coop-
erate with two other members of the founding team and they
started to engage in developing a new business idea. Busi-
ness D1 continued to exist as “living dead” for several months
before eventually going bankrupt. After the official claim for
bankruptcy, entrepreneur D founded business D2, which was
also established in the IT sector but with a new customer fo-
cus and different cost structure. More information on the
respective business models of business D1 and business D2
can be seen in Table 4.
Having a look at the business model designs, it becomes
obvious that changes from business D1 to business D2 were
made. The content element of business D1 shows move-
ments towards complementarities as well as lock-in-centered
value creation and capture. Business D1 offered standard-
ized IT products for customer relation management and in
addition offered their customers a consulting service on IT
related topics. The product and the consulting service were
designed to create and capture value through their comple-
mentary relationship. As can be seen in the content element
of business D2, it does not make use of complementarities
anymore. Business D2 no longer offers any IT consulting ser-
vice but focuses on a standardized IT customer relationship
management tool as a service. Due to the possibility to of-
fer the same product to multiple customers without making
any adaptions, the content element of business D2 has an
efficiency-centered design. Thus, the strategic focus shifted.
The structure element of business D1 follows a clear
vision for a lock-in-centered design. Entrepreneur D ex-
plained that business D1 was relying on five key customers
and aimed for keeping up these relations. Furthermore, the
key customers were involved in innovation processes. The
active search for and interest in long-term network partners,
who are involved in the business, supports the argument
that the structure element is lock-in-centered. However,
entrepreneur D stated that there was no real incentive for
customers to stay with the firm. Consequently, as described
above one customer eventually quit the cooperation. Thus,
it can be assumed that the lock-in-centered design was not
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Figure 7: Case D Timeline of Events
Table 4: Comparison of Business Models between Business D1 and Business D2
Business D1 Business D2
Content Content
• IT consulting; standardized customer relation-
ship management as a service
• IT resources and skills needed
• no skills and knowledge needed to use offerings;
customer friendly use
• restricted information flow towards customers
determination of IT consulting; except for this no
relevant changes
Structure Structure
• full occupation of capacity by five key customers;
eye-level treatment of key customers; flexibility
related to key customer demands; key customers
involved in innovation processes
• proactive acquisition of network partners based
on personal networks; cooperation with external
network partners
• acquisition of new customers less important and
only done by chance; main focus on long-term
customer relationships; no changes in customer
treatment and flexibility of fulfilling customer de-
mands
• lock-in effect of previous networks
Governance Governance
• no specific security mechanisms to protect firm
specific knowledge
• formal coordination mechanisms
• independent and self-directed employees; high
responsibility for own actions; access to business
related information
• no specific security mechanisms to protect firm
specific knowledge towards network partners;
protection of firm specific knowledge towards
customers
• informal coordination mechanisms established
in internal relations and relations with network
partners; formal coordination mechanisms in
customer relations
• formal coordination mechanisms related to em-
ployees
fully implemented. In comparison, the structure element
of business D2 is designed to be efficient. Entrepreneur D
explained that within business D2 it is more important to
take care of a small number of customers than to spend too
much money on expensive marketing campaigns. In addi-
tion, business D2 makes use of existing networks and builds
on an efficient exchange of information for example with
a sister company, which also developed out of business D1.
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Overall, entrepreneur D stated that it is of utmost importance
to business D2 to keep costs low and aim for a better cost
structure to offer customers a product at a reasonable price.
So it can be seen that the structure element of business D2
is designed with an efficiency-centered focus, in line with its
content element.
Considering the governance element of business D1, it
shows lacks in terms of a clearly defined value-driver. The ba-
sic idea is to create and capture value through a lock-in effect,
but loyalty programs or incentives to keep up customer, net-
work and employee relations are missing. In contrast, within
business D2 the governance element follows an efficiency-
centered design. Only low-cost governance mechanisms are
installed and as patents are rather expensive, entrepreneur
refrains from applying. Moreover, employees are not as inte-
grated and there are formal coordination mechanisms. Thus,
business D2 is able to release employees efficiently, quickly
and easy, without losing firm-specific knowledge, in the case
of negative developments.
All in all and as stated by entrepreneur D, the business
model design of business D1, was rather created to be lock-
in-centered but shows inconsistency in terms of the strategic
focus. Among business model elements of business D1 the
strategic focus changes from a complementarities-centered
design to a lock-in-centered design. Furthermore, a lock-in-
centered business model design seems to not fit with ecosys-
tem specificities as the product is a standardized one and cus-
tomers are not necessarily bound to business D1. Thus, ulti-
mately business D1 went bankrupt. After business D1 went
bankrupt, entrepreneur D had the opportunity to deeply re-
flect on previous business activities, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 7. Entrepreneur D explained that a clear restart from
scratch was necessary. He further explained that as compe-
tences stayed the same, it soon became clear that the offered
service would be similar. Nevertheless, he was able to erase
problematic implications and inconsistencies. The success of
the reflection time can be seen in the business model design
of business D2. Entrepreneur D was able to detect strengths
and weaknesses and worked on them. Thereby, the business
model of business D1 shows a clear efficiency-centered de-
sign and so far seems to match ecosystem specificities. Con-
sequently, entrepreneur D changed his strategic behavior and
shows behavioral outcomes. Concluding, it can be seen that
change and entrepreneurial learning in terms of the business
model design took place and appear to make business D2
profitable and successful in the long-run.
Case E. Entrepreneur E has an academic background in
the machinery and technology field. The foundation of busi-
ness E1 was based on the regional specificity of the case.
The region experienced a structural transformation, which
lead to the decrease of business activities. However, the
founding team was eager to work against the continuous de-
crease of business activities through promoting innovation.
Thus, business E1 was founded as a start-up center for en-
trepreneurs who were interested in setting up their own busi-
ness preferably with a technological focus. The business idea
encompassed a designated start-up center, where potential
entrepreneurs can rent commercial space and receive sup-
port and consulting service at the same time in the same
place. As revenues were generated through leasing commer-
cial space, business E1 was dependent on rents paid by the
frequently changing residing newly established firms. In the
beginning, marketing campaigns were highly successful and
many entrepreneurs established their base at business E1,
even though it was located offside. In 2006 however, the
amount of spaces rented decreased tremendously, which ul-
timately lead to the failure of business E1. Figure 8 provides
a detailed timeline of events.
During the next three years, Entrepreneur E was engaged
in restructuring, reorganization and renovation of the ini-
tial business idea and founded business E2 in 2009. Busi-
ness E2 offers similar services as the previous business but
the focus shifted from renting commercial spaces on to con-
sulting services. Nowadays, 80% of revenues are generated
through consulting services and only 20% through the rent-
ing business. In addition, before the failure consulting ser-
vices and start-up support were usually only provided for en-
trepreneurs who decided to establish their business in the
start-up center. After the failure, the start-up support and
consulting service can be used by anyone interested and is
promoted throughout the whole region. Table 5 shows the
business models of business E1 and business E2.
In comparison, there are changes in the business model
designs between business E1 and business E2. Considering
the content element of business E1, it shows characteristics
of a complementarities-centered design, as the offered com-
mercial space and consulting service show a complementary
relationship. Within the content element of business E2 how-
ever the main focus of business shifted to generating profit
through the consulting service rather than from renting com-
mercial space complementing the consulting service. Renting
commercial space is an add-on source of revenues to business
E2. Thus, entrepreneur E makes use out of existing assets ef-
ficiently. In addition, value creation in the content element is
supported by transparency and information sharing as well as
making use of existent entrepreneurial knowledge Thus, the
content element of business E2 shows an efficiency-centered
design.
Considering the structure element, the structure element
of business E1 also is designed to gain value out of comple-
mentarities. Proactive acquisition of network partners to be
able to cross-sell services from network partners to customers
is a characteristic of a complementarities-centered design.
Also in business E2, the structure element shows the same
design as the content element as it has characteristics of an
efficiency-centered business model design. Costs for market-
ing are kept low, as business E2 benefits from word-of-mouth
marketing and there are no specific marketing campaigns to
advertise the consulting service. Entrepreneur E explains that
the start-up center is well known in the region and market-
ing and sales programs are not necessary. Furthermore, the
long-term relationships with network-partners help business
E2 to offer the consulting service at highest efficiency level.
No new network partners need to be acquired, but business
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Figure 8: Case E Timeline of Events
Table 5: Comparison of Business Models between Business E1 and Business E2
Business E1 Business E2
Content Content
• leasing of commercial spaces in a designated
start-up center following entrepreneurial con-
sulting during business foundation process
• prior entrepreneurial experience and knowledge
needed to offer service
• no skills and knowledge needed to use service
• intense information flow towards employees and
customers
• consulting of entrepreneurs during business
foundation process; support of start-up projects;
business consulting; leasing of commercial space
no further relevant changes
Structure Structure
• proactive acquisition of customers; eye-level
treatment of customers; flexible in fulfilling cus-
tomer demands and needs
• proactive acquisition of network partners based
on personal and professional networks; cooper-
ation with external network partners; network
partners involved in innovation processes
• word-of-mouth marketing; no changes in cus-
tomer treatment; more flexibility in fulfilling cus-
tomer demands and needs
• activation of existing networks to form long-term
network relations; no change in network part-
ners’ involvement in innovation processes
Governance Governance
• no specific security mechanisms to protect firm
specific knowledge
• formal long-term relationships with network
partners
• informal coordination mechanisms among em-
ployees
• independent and self-directed employees; high
responsibility for own actions; access to business
related information
no relevant changes
E2 makes use out of existing networks and their knowledge
and skills. And thus aims for efficiency.
The governance element shows no relevant change from
business E1 to business E2. The governance element is de-
signed to generate value at lowest costs as possible. There-
fore, there are no installed security mechanisms or any
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other mechanisms to protect firm-specific knowledge. En-
trepreneur E explains that actually anyone is able to consult
with entrepreneurs and help them setting up their business
as soon as the consultant has some personal experience with
entrepreneurship. Thus, the job or the general consulting
activity cannot be protected. The informal coordination
mechanisms among employees, network partners and cus-
tomers aim for uncomplicated and efficient data and infor-
mation processing. Overall, the governance element has an
efficiency-centered design in business E1 and business E2.
Concluding, the overall business model design changed
from a complementarities-centered design in business E1 to
an efficiency-centered design in business E2. Even though
business E1 had a clear strategy how to create and capture
value, changes in customer behavior diminished the only
source of income, renting commercial space. Entrepreneur E
explains that the offside-location might be one of the causes
for the decrease of rent-ins, but generally there are more and
more entrepreneurs who are interested in starting a busi-
ness from home to not generate any costs for commercial
space. As the demand for the commercial space declined and
thus also revenues declined, business E1 was threatened by
bankruptcy. In consequence, the business model design no
longer fitted with ecosystem specificities. In addition, busi-
ness E1 was not build to be flexible and adapt to any changes
and thus failed. Entrepreneur E reflected and stated that it
took some time to reflect on business failure, talk to advisors,
network partners and investors to take the next step. The re-
sult of the reflection time can be seen in the business model
of business E2, which is much more flexible and tries to be as
efficient as possible. Also all three business model elements
of business E2 have an efficiency-centered design, whereas
the governance element of business E1 was not supporting a
complementarities-centered business model design. Overall,
business E2 is designed to continuously adapt to ecosystem
changes in an efficient way. So far, the survival of business
E2 shows that changes improved the situation. Concluding,
entrepreneur E shows changes in strategic behavior indicat-
ing behavioral outcomes and failure-based entrepreneurial
learning took place.
After analyzing each case, it can be seen that out of five
entrepreneurs only three seem to have gone through the
whole business failure process and have learned something
out the failure experience. In particular, within cases B,
D and E the respective entrepreneur reflected on business
failure and tried to incorporate behavioral outcomes in a
subsequent business. Entrepreneurs A and C seem to have
not learned that much and did not thoroughly reflect on why
their initial business failed. In consequence, changes in the
business model design appear to be random and only happen
by chance but do not directly work on any interference.
Concerning the first research question, how do business
models of an entrepreneur’s failed business and the subse-
quent business differ, it can be seen that there are changes.
However, slightly in contrast to previous literature and expec-
tations, each entrepreneur only revised the business model
design rather than developed a complete new business idea
and business model. Within no case did all three business
model elements change, but at least one showed no relevant
changes. In consequence, the first research question can be
answered. The business models of an entrepreneur’s failed
business and the subsequent business do differ, but the en-
trepreneur rather tends to revise it than to introduce some-
thing totally new. Thus, entrepreneurs who restart seem to be
different from serial entrepreneurs, who enjoy continuously
developing novel business ideas.
4.2. Cross-case Analysis
In the following, the presented cases A to E are considered
as groundwork to develop propositions, which shall help to
better understand behavioral outcomes of business failure.
Behavioral outcomes are the last step of the failure process
presented in Figure 1. It will be investigated whether there
are patterns among the different cases. The derived proposi-
tions aim for answering the second research question: What
explains possible business model differences?
The findings presented in Chapter 4.1 show that it is im-
portant for entrepreneurs to have a business with a coherent
business model concept and a clear value-driver within the
different business model elements. In addition, it is essential
for businesses to fit eco-system specific characteristics. Incon-
sistency within the business model elements and/or no fit to
the eco-system lead to business failure. These patterns can be
seen in the failed businesses C1, B1, D1 and E1. Business C1
in general is not coherent in the business model elements, as
there is no clear value driver. In addition, business C1 shows
no match with eco-system specificities. As described above,
entrepreneur C explained potential value drivers, networks,
but did not aim for long-term network relationships. Busi-
ness E1 showed inconsistency in terms of the governance el-
ement, as it did not support value creation and capture. Fur-
thermore, the content element of business E1 at some point
did not match ecosystem demands anymore. Thus, business
E1 experienced inconsistency within the business model ele-
ments and no fit to the eco-system. Considering businesses
B1 and D1, both failed businesses lack conclusiveness in their
business model elements. Particularly for both cases, the
structure element in itself shows inconsistencies and does not
meet external demands. Hence, it is assumed that a lack of
a well developed and a well-thought business model design
influences business failure. In contrast, the business model
design of business A1 seemed to match ecosystem conditions
and to be consistent among business model elements. But
business A1 was negatively affected by a strong dependency
on entrepreneur A. The dependency then interfered with the
success of the business model design. So findings in case A
are also in accordance with the line of reasoning, as busi-
ness A1 and expectedly also business A2 were and are not
able to adapt to the ecosystem influence that at some point
entrepreneur A has to leave the business. Expert 2 supports
this particular finding by highlighting that “entrepreneurs in
general usually focus on the daily business and experience a
lack of time to objectively analyze their business activities”. Ex-
pert 1 adds that many entrepreneurs do not understand or
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do not look at the complexity of their business in terms of an
ecosystem fit or internal coherency. She said “in case of expe-
rienced difficulties entrepreneurs often just work on symptoms
but do not consider the source of the problem”. Therefore, it is
derived:
Proposition 1: A lack of internal and/or external
business model fit is likely to enhance the prob-
ability of business failure.
In general, the cases are characterized by a rather short
time span between the business failure of the initial business
and the foundation of a subsequent business. Having a closer
look on Figures 4 to 8 and the respective business model con-
cepts for the initial, failed business and subsequent business
(as displayed in Tables 1 to 5), it can be seen that there are
different patterns among the cases concerning time. Cases A
and C show little to a non-existent time span between busi-
ness failure of the respective initial business and a subsequent
business. Entrepreneur A specifically stated: “I founded my
second business immediately after the end of my first business”.
Entrepreneur C also founded her subsequent business imme-
diately after the initial business C1 failed. In contrast are
cases B, D and E. Within all three cases there was at least one
year in between the business failure of the initial business
and the foundation of a subsequent business. Having a closer
look on the business model changes in the three cases B, D
and E, considerable changes did happen in terms of content,
structure and governance. On the other hand, within case C
only random changes to the business model took place and
only slight changes to the business model were employed in
case A. Especially, in case A the business model concept of the
subsequent business seems to be a copy of the initial busi-
ness’s business model. Entrepreneur A also stated “nothing
has changed”. Entrepreneur C made a similar statement, say-
ing: “I did not have to change anything as the business idea and
how we did business was great and had nothing to do with the
bankruptcy”. Following these statements, it can be assumed,
that neither entrepreneur A nor C did reflect on the failure
of their initial business and there was probably no time for
reflection either. In contrast, Entrepreneurs B, D and E had
and took the time to reflect on the business failure experi-
ence and to rethink business activities. Entrepreneur B de-
scribed his situation in the interview: “I knew something was
wrong but it took some time to finally change something in the
business to be successful again”. Entrepreneur E goes even
further and states that: “Structural, deep and well-planned
reflection on past events and future entrepreneurial activities
is most important when it comes to business failure” and he
added “something has to change, otherwise no business can
survive”. Entrepreneur D experienced similar reflection and
realization attempts in-between his two businesses D1 and
D2, as described in the within-case analysis. Accordingly,
entrepreneurs B, D and E changed their business model on
purpose and with the ultimate goal to found a reformed and
more successful business compared to the initial, failed busi-
nesses. Having a look at business models of businesses B2,
D2 and E2, they in consequence seem to better fit internal
and external demands, whereas businesses A2 and C2 will
probably eventually experience similar problems as the re-
spective initial, failed businesses. In this context, expert 2
points out, "many entrepreneurs do not reflect on their fail-
ure. Therefore, restarted businesses are excessively affected by
the threat of failure”. However, expert 2 also admits, that “if
the entrepreneur has time to reflect and to work on issues, then
change can happen”. Consequently, a second finding is:
Proposition 2: The longer the time span be-
tween business failure and the foundation of a
subsequent business, the less alike are the busi-
ness model designs of the failed business and the
subsequent business.
Similar groups as for Proposition 2 form when looking
at the pattern among cases concerning external advice. As
entrepreneurs A and C reported, they did not take any ad-
vice between the failure of their initial business and the foun-
dation of their subsequent business. Consequently, both en-
trepreneurs, A and C did not actually develop new concepts
or thoughts on a subsequent business and how it might be
improved in comparison to the failed businesses A1 and C1.
During the interviews and the within-case analysis, it became
clear, that no behavioral change did happen. Therefore, no
strategically intended changes can be noticed when compar-
ing the business models of failed businesses A1 and C1 with
their respective subsequent businesses A2 and C2. In con-
trast, entrepreneurs B, D and E reported that they had and
used external advice in the time span between business fail-
ure and restarting with the foundation of a subsequent busi-
ness. For example, entrepreneur D pointed out “we inten-
sively cooperate with our personal network partners to develop
and improve our business” and entrepreneur E told that he
“benefitted from the business’s public associates, who were in-
terested in renovating the business to be successful again. They
helped and supported the in-between phase with words and
deeds”. Also entrepreneur B explicitly highlighted the impor-
tance of external advice, and named his new business part-
ner and the new investor as driving forces for development
and change. Thus, it can be observed that the subsequent
businesses, B2, D2 and E2 show considerable improvements
within their business model concepts in terms of consistency,
coherency and ecosystem fit. Expert 1 emphasized the im-
portance of external advice by telling that “an opinion from
someone who is not involved in the business, such as a friend,
a consultant or even the entrepreneur’s wife is needed to re-
ally see why the business failed”. Expert 2 strongly believes
in the necessity of “introducing a new brain”. She explained
that changes only happen if there is someone new who initi-
ates these changes and stated that “without an initiator of new
ideas the newly restart business is likely to fail again”. Based on
her job experience she highlighted that “people tend to make
the same mistakes over and over again when no critical inci-
dents force them to change their behavior”. Thus, it can be
concluded:
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Proposition 3: The more an integration of exter-
nal advice takes place, the less alike are the busi-
ness model designs of the failed business and the
subsequent business.
Considering costs of failure, all entrepreneurs experi-
enced costs of failure in some way, but not every entrepreneur
did directly admit them, which leads to the assumption that
denial takes place. Accordingly, the perception of costs of
failure differs among entrepreneurs. As within the two pre-
vious propositions, two specifications regarding the handling
of costs of failure can be identified. During the interview, it
was directly asked if costs of failure occurred after the busi-
ness failure event. Entrepreneurs A and C stated that costs
of failure did not occur. However, entrepreneur A mentioned
further, that “customers were not that confident in the new
business. They were afraid that something had changed. But
I was able to convince them that we would still offer the same
hybrid solutions and that I am still responsible for every single
step“. This statement confirms that costs of failure, in partic-
ular social costs of failure, did actually occur. Accordingly,
entrepreneur C explained her situation as follows: “the whole
family was involved in the first business and we all are finan-
cially dependent on the subsequent business“. Entrepreneur
C further stated that she had no outside options, as did
entrepreneur A. Thus, both entrepreneurs were financially
dependent on the business and with the failure of the initial
business, A1 and C1, faced to some extent financial costs of
failure. Beside the obviously experienced costs of failure,
entrepreneur A and C deny their existence and refrain from
speaking openly about their experiences with business failure
and also deny their own responsibility regarding the failure
event. In contrast, entrepreneurs B, D and E do speak openly
about their failure, their problems and issues. Entrepreneur
B explained that after his first business failed, “it was impor-
tant to talk openly to employees and network partners about
what had happened“. Entrepreneur E stated, “we have to be
open to customers and network partners that the financial situ-
ation is difficult and that we had to change our main source of
income and therefore are less financially independent.“ During
the interview, all three entrepreneurs B, D and E, pointed
out that they actually had outside options and were not de-
pendent on a subsequent business but had the opportunity
to work for another employer and secure a regular income.
Entrepreneur B particularly explained: ”Of course I had the
option to become the manager of another firm but I wanted to
keep up my entrepreneurial activity.“ In addition, he stated
”I expected my environment to react badly to my failure, but
in contrast to my expectations my network partners never lost
their trust in me and my former employees who were living in
my village and whom I had to release also kept the social contact
with me“. Expert 2 explains the behavior of entrepreneurs
as follows: ”Many entrepreneurs are not seeing their mistakes
and do not want to lose their status. Here we talk about a
loss of face. Usually, denial takes place and entrepreneurs only
ask for help when they see no other possibility. However, many
businesses could be saved if entrepreneurs would ask for help
earlier and we could restructure and redevelop the business“.
Therefore, it can be derived:
Proposition 4: The more the entrepreneur is
willing to deal openly with costs of failure, the
less alike are the business model designs of the
failed business and the subsequent business.
Overall there are three detected influence factors, which
explain possible business model differences and thus provide
an answer to the second research question. In accordance
with Propositions 2, 3 and 4, time, external advice and the
handling with costs of failure affect how alike the business
model designs of the failed and the subsequent business are.
Patterns among the cases showed that the more time between
the business failure and the foundation of a subsequent busi-
ness, the more external advice is integrated and the more
openly entrepreneurs deal with costs of failure, the less alike
are the business model designs of the failed business and the
subsequent business. The derived propositions are summa-
rized in Figure 9. Consequently, restarting has an effect on
the business model design given that learning from business
failure took place. In general, it can also be concluded that
the less coherent business model elements are and the lower
the fit with ecosystem a business model design has, the more
likely it is that a business will fail.
5. Discussion
In alignment with Eisenhardt (1989), to build theory
it is important to reflect on existing theories and literature
and compare it with derived concepts, in this case derived
propositions. To do so, it is advisable to analyze propositions
against a broad range of literature. Thereby, similarities and
contradictions to existent literature can be found and the aim
is to provide reasons for discrepancies and resemblances. In
consequence, in the following paragraphs each proposition
will be considered individually and reflected to matching
literature.
Proposition 1 states that a lack of internal and/or exter-
nal business model fit is likely to enhance the probability
of business failure. To create a successful, sustainable and
realizable business, it is not only important to ensure a vi-
able business model design but to always adapt the business
model to evolving ecosystem changes (Teece (2010)). Fur-
thermore, internal fit, coherency and linkages among the dif-
ferent business model elements, content, structure and gov-
ernance is essential for sustainability of a business (Zott and
Amit (2010)). To be able to arrange the business model ele-
ments, the entrepreneur is required to have specific cognitive
capabilities (Helfat and Peteraf (2014)). However, the pre-
sented cases show that at least for the initial businesses en-
trepreneurs do have difficulties to develop the right business
model concept for their respective business. The question is,
why are there difficulties?
Generally, the business model concept is assumed to be
a great opportunity for entrepreneurs to objectively derive
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Figure 9: Summary of Propositions
how to create and capture value (George and Bock (2011)).
It represents a mechanism from which entrepreneurs can eas-
ily start to build a business (Amit and Zott (2001)). Thus, the
concept has gained importance over the years (Morris et al.
(2005)). Consequently, it is essential for entrepreneurs to be
aware of the business model concept and also to consider it
during the start-up phase. Even though building a business
on the grounds of business model concept is rather easy and
quick, it is however difficult to keep the business model vi-
able. Particularly being in the position where resources might
be limited, the entrepreneur has to deal with a lot of different
responsibilities as the leader of the business. Consequently,
the entrepreneur might be overwhelmed by the work-load
and uncertainty. Entrepreneurs who face such an overload
tend to use cognitive shortcuts and are also biased in their
cognitive behavior (Forbes (2005)). Considering Proposition
1, these cognitive constraints need to be taken into account.
In particular, the entrepreneur might be limited to see the
business as a whole due to cognitive constraints. Conse-
quently, he or she might not be able to adapt the business
model to a changing internal and/or external environment
as the entrepreneur tends to rather focus on the day-to-day
business than aligning all business elements and tackle issues
created by the ecosystem.
Cognitive biases in general are another interesting as-
pect when it comes to find an explanation for Proposition
1. Kickul et al. (2009) found that an individual’s cognitive
analysis or intuition has an influence on an entrepreneur’s
self-efficacy when creating a new business. The authors de-
picted two cognitive styles. Entrepreneurs, who show an
intuitive cognitive style, are confident in finding new busi-
ness opportunities, but are less confident in terms of taking
care of every-day business such as ”assessment, evaluation,
planning, and marshaling of resources“ (Kickul et al. (2009):
439). On the other hand, there are entrepreneurs, who show
an analytic cognitive style and are confident in dealing with
every-day business but are less confident in being able to rec-
ognize or develop new business opportunities. The respec-
tive cognitive style is assumed to have an impact on business
model innovation, thus on the development of a viable busi-
ness model. Nevertheless, it still needs to be verified in which
way the impact or influence works (Spieth et al. (2014)).
However, the argument of different cognitive styles explains
why some entrepreneurs do not consider the internal or ex-
ternal environment and rather focus on the day-to-day busi-
ness.
Proposition 2 reads, the longer the time span between
business failure and foundation of the subsequent business,
the less alike are the business model designs of the failed
business and the subsequent business. Proposing that a
longer time span increases the learning effect from business
failure is rather natural. Reflecting on existent literature on
business models (McGrath (2010); Sosna et al. (2010)), it is
pointed out that to develop and transform a business model
it takes a long time due to the time-intensive learning process
involved. Thus, it becomes obvious that for entrepreneurs
who did not take much time between the failure of the initial
business and the foundation of a subsequent business, no ex-
tensive learning process could take place. And therefore only
little, random or non-relevant changes within the business
model of a subsequent business are depicted. However, as
Ucbasaran et al. (2013) point out, even though it is expected
that business failure presents a key moment which starts a
learning process, so far no concrete learning outcomes were
investigated. In line with the main research gap, the cases
aimed for delivering a detailed view on concrete behavioral
outcomes from business failure. But the behavioral change is
not as obvious as it is suggested by literature (Cope (2011);
Ucbasaran et al. (2013)) as not all cases show a relevant
strategic change in terms of the business model from an
initial, failed business to a subsequent business.
In comparison to existent literature (e.g. Cope (2011)),
the time-span between the failure of the initial business and
the foundation of a subsequent business in the cases is in-
deed rather short. As depicted for example by Cope (2011),
he found that entrepreneurs take much time to overcome
A. K. Bauer / Junior Management Science 1 (2016) 32-60 55
their grief about the business failure and need the time to
deal with costs of failure. However, this was not the case
within the findings. Nevertheless, that does not mean that
the interviewed entrepreneurs did recovery very fast. Par-
ticularly, those cases in which there was nearly no time in
between the initial and subsequent business, they did not ex-
perience the phases ”Aftermath“, Learning and Sensemaking
and Cognitive and Behavioral Outcomes as shown in Figure
1. But, these phases are essential for recovery from the busi-
ness failure event and presumably for entrepreneurial learn-
ing. Within the cases, some entrepreneurs seem to skip the
”Aftermath“ and Sensemaking and Learning phase and im-
mediately jump to the outcome, which is the creation of a
new business. The jump to a new business opportunity might
be caused by the lack of outside options. As described above,
some entrepreneurs, in particular entrepreneurs A and C,
stated that they had no other choice than starting a new busi-
ness. Even though the entrepreneurs started as opportunity
entrepreneurs, their situation changed over time leading to
the consequence where they become necessity entrepreneurs
(e.g. Block and Koellinger (2009)). Thus, in addition to
Ucbasaran et al. (2013) who state that external attribution
and negative emotions negatively influence sensemaking and
learning, the presented cases show that a lack of time and re-
sources also hinder entrepreneurs to enter a time of critical
reflection (Cope (2011)).
In accordance with business model literature, having the
opportunity to transform or even innovate the implemented
business model presents a way in which entrepreneurs may
create new markets and discover new opportunities (e.g.
Amit and Zott (2012); Spieth et al. (2014)). However, the
cases show that learning, transformation and innovation did
not take place. But entrepreneurs rather revised their failed
business’s business model. This particular behavior can be
explained by literature on inertia such as by Tushman and
O’Reilly (1996). Tushman and O’Reilly (1996) found that
managers, within this thesis entrepreneurs, tend to stick to
their former successful norms and routines. At some point
each failed business presented in Chapter 4 was indeed suc-
cessful. Traditional learning literature (e.g. Argyris and
Schön (1978)) underlines and supports the finding. It is
said that it is necessary to unlearn and start from scratch in
order to be able to learn something new. Also Zott and Amit
(2010) emphasize that it is more difficult for entrepreneurs
to rethink an existent business model than to build a new
one. Thus, as entrepreneurs do not have the time or do not
take the time to go through the whole learning process and
decide to restart soon, they only deal with direct and obvious
symptoms of failure and do not reflect on the whole business
model focusing on long-term success.
Proposition 3 considered the role of external advice, sug-
gesting that the more an integration of external advice takes
place, the less alike are the business model designs of the
failed business and the subsequent business. As investigated
in existent literature (e.g. Cope (2003); Cope (2011)), dis-
continuous events stimulate learning. Thus, entrepreneurs
are expected to learn something from business failure (Cope
(2003); Cope (2011); Ucbasaran et al. (2013)). However,
Cope (2003) states that the influence of an entrepreneur’s
ecosystem also needs to be taken into account when talking
about learning from discontinuous events such as business
failure. The presented cases show that the embeddedness
of an entrepreneur in the ecosystem influences the similar-
ity between the initial, failed business and subsequent busi-
ness, which is in line with Cope (2003). Embeddedness in
the ecosystem refers to the overall cooperation and consult-
ing with network partners, customers, consultants, impor-
tant persons, etc. and is not limited to professional net-
works but also includes personal ties (Taylor and Thorpe
(2004)). Considering Taylor and Thorpe (2004), the authors
suggest that personal as well as professional networks in-
fluence the decision-making process of entrepreneurs, which
holds true in their conducted study. Consequently, Taylor and
Thorpe (2004) argue that in the case of a discontinuous event
network interactions can stimulate a reflection and learn-
ing process. Within the presented cases it becomes obvious
that those entrepreneurs who considered advice, namely en-
trepreneurs B, D and E, seem to have learned more out of the
business failure event than entrepreneurs A and C who did
not consult. In addition, Sullivan (2000) states that mentors
enhance learning and reflection when an entrepreneur faces
problems and disturbing events, which also explains Propo-
sition 3 and is in line with the argumentation by Taylor and
Thorpe (2004).
A second explanation for Proposition 3 is based on the
arguments presented by Prahalad (2004) and Prahalad and
Ramaswamy (2004). Over time, a firm and thus the en-
trepreneur relies on previously successful processes for value
creation and thus focuses on the existing business model.
Therefore, successful strategies become embedded in the
organization and are commonly known as dominant logic.
Dominant logic states that the value of a business is solely
embedded in products and services the business produces
itself. In consequence, entrepreneurs are hindered to see
new opportunities and threats and be innovative. However,
it is rather easy for competitors to adapt the value creating
strategy and to threaten the business. In turn, as dominant
logic works as a blinder, the entrepreneur does not see the
threat and is most likely to experience problems and also
business failure. To be able to survive, change must happen.
However, it is difficult to change something without taking
other opinions and views into account. Thus, it is important
for entrepreneurs to think out of the box, consider dialogue
with a source of competence and take the environment into
account (Prahalad (2004)). Considering the concrete rela-
tionship between a business and its customers, it shows that
value can be created by the joint cooperation between the
two parties and is ”key to unlocking new sources of compet-
itive advantage“ (Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2004): 7).
Proposition 4 states the more the entrepreneur is will-
ing to deal openly with costs of failure, the less alike are
the business model designs of the failed business and the
subsequent business. Focusing on financial, social and psy-
chological costs of failure (Ucbasaran et al. (2013)), all en-
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trepreneurs from the cases experienced costs of failure. How-
ever, each entrepreneur deals differently with them. As de-
scribed in Chapter 4.2 there are two groups. One is dealing
openly with costs of failure and the other denies their ex-
istence. As previously mentioned, external attribution bias
is a barrier to learning and sensemaking after business fail-
ure (Ucbasaran et al. (2013)). This barrier might also play
a role when denying costs of failure. Within the cases some
entrepreneurs, in particular entrepreneur A and C, contin-
ued doing business as usual after business failure. This is not
only due to a lack of learning but can also be seen in the con-
text of concealing and masking business failure. Thereby, the
entrepreneur tries to prevent social devaluation, which cor-
responds to social costs of failure (Ucbasaran et al. (2013)).
In particular, the stigma, which is attached to failure, may
lead to the entrepreneur’s self-exclusion from social activi-
ties (Cope (2011)) and ultimately to a breakdown of social
ties within the personal and professional network. But, espe-
cially for businesses which have a lock-in-centered business
model design, social ties are of utmost importance, as it is
constituted by long-term relationships, which build on trust
and are a source for value creation and capture (Amit and
Zott (2001)).
As depicted in Chapter 2.1, social costs of failure may also
increase financial costs of failure (Cope (2011)). Therefore,
entrepreneurs who do not have any outside options but must
rely on existing network partners and customers to ensure
an income have to keep up their appearance. But, if en-
trepreneurs actually recognize the approaching and threaten-
ing failure of the business, he or she has the time to adjust to
this particular situation. Consequently, these entrepreneurs
can prepare and look for outside options, which then limit
costs of failure. Additionally, entrepreneurs can also dimin-
ish social costs of failure by preparing themselves. As sooner
an entrepreneur accepts the approaching failure event, the
more time they have to cope with the changing situation and
their experiences. In line with Shepherd and Haynie (2011),
if environmental conditions allow it, it is sometimes favor-
able to accept the responsibility for failure and thus employ
an accepting-responsibility strategy of impression manage-
ment. This strategy in turn forces the entrepreneur to rethink
his past decisions and in the following facilitates deliberate
changes with respect to the business model of subsequent
businesses.
6. Conclusion and Outlook
In accordance with Henry Ford, business failure presents
the opportunity to begin again, but incorporating what has
been learned. This master thesis aimed for investigating be-
havioural outcomes of business failure particularly analysing
whether learning from business failure also leads to changes
in the (strategic) behavior of entrepreneurs.
By employing the business model concept as a unit of
analysis in the context of restart entrepreneurship, I am able
to provide in-depth, empirically-based insights into behav-
ioral outcomes of failure-based entrepreneurial learning. Re-
lated to the first research question, which considered dif-
ferences between the business models of an entrepreneur’s
failed business and the subsequent business, it shows that
entrepreneurs who start a new business employ a business
model design that is very much alike to the one utilized in
a failed business. The multiple-case study provides evidence
that an entrepreneur rather improves the business model of
the failed business than creating a completely novel business
model design for a subsequent, new business.
With regard to the explanation of differences in the busi-
ness model design of the failed business and the subsequent
business, which was addressed by the second research ques-
tion, the cross-case analysis points to the relevance of cog-
nitive aspects as well as situation-specific conditions. The
role of cognitive aspects in the context of failure-based learn-
ing is already highlighted in literature (e.g. Ucbasaran et al.
(2013)). The findings enhance existing literature as this
thesis highlights that failure-based learning does not hap-
pen automatically, but requires certain cognitive capabilities
that depict a precondition for successful transfer of learning
outcomes to an operational level. Moreover, case findings
provide new insights by clearly indicating that failure-based
learning in general is affected by situation-specific conditions
such as outside options, network support, or the time span
between failure and restart.
Nevertheless, the thesis and its results are limited in some
terms. Data was only collected in one country, namely Ger-
many. Thus, a country-specific bias may influence the find-
ings in Chapter 4. In addition, there was no restriction on
industry. All cases are established in varying industries and
industry-specific characteristics are not taken into account.
Comparability might be influenced by data from different in-
dustries. Additionally, each industry has its own characteris-
tics and for some industries business failure is more common
compared to others. Thus, also restarting may be easier and
usual for some industries. Lastly, there were no time limits
for the different cases. Thus, the cases show many differ-
ences in terms of their timeline of events and survival time of
the initial, failed business and the subsequent business. For
example, business A1 survived for a long time-span as did its
successor business A2. However, business C2 only exists for
one year.
Overall, future research based on this thesis may focus on
three items. First of all, to get a more general view, the same
study should be conducted in more than one country. As
larger the sample gets, also a quantitative approach might be
appropriate for future research. In addition, a different unit
of analysis may be used as also suggested by Ucbasaran et al.
(2013). Also a different business model approach might lead
to different findings. For example, the business model meta-
model by Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010) is a good start to
investigate whether the entrepreneur worked on weaknesses
in the business model comparing the initial, failed business
and subsequent business. Managers or entrepreneur on the
other hand shall use the findings as a guide. The thesis high-
lights the importance of the business model and its benefits
for the real-world as a tool to objectively consider value cre-
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ation and capture. In particular, the entrepreneur or man-
ager shall check and critically analyze his or her business in
terms of the internal and external fit the business model de-
sign. Furthermore, in the case of an approaching or already
existent business failure, entrepreneurs should take time for
reflection and learning; consider external advice and accept
responsibilities and deal with costs of failure openly.
To sum up, the thesis highlights a difference between
business closure and serial entrepreneurship on the one
hand and business failure and restart entrepreneurship on
the other hand. This distinction is of particular importance
for entrepreneurship research, as the behavior of serial en-
trepreneurs seems to follow a different logic compared to
restart entrepreneurs. This important finding calls for fu-
ture research that may rely on the thesis as groundwork
and contributes to a deeper understanding of restart en-
trepreneurship.
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